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PacificAbstract: In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only
that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiri-
cism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes per-
ception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought
well-summarized in Hume’s maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between
distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities,
perception is too passive or localized a faculty to register them. We defend the
perception of necessity against such Humeanism, drawing on examples
from mathematics.1. Examples of diagrams in which necessity is perceived
We may gain knowledge that 2×3=3×2 not by rote but by looking at the
diagram:e 1 Why 2×3=3×2.
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PERCEIVING NECESSITY 321What is being perceived in this case? We are not just perceiving that
2× 3 is 3×2, but that 2× 3must be 3×2. It is clear that to try to create an-
other option – such as 2×3=3×3 –would be futile. It is as though we can
see the truth and at the same time the reason why it must be true.1 It there-
fore appears that, at least in the case of mathematics, we may perceive
necessary truth.
What has just been said typically attracts many objections. What
does it mean to see a reason? Surely reasons are more stated or un-
derstood than seen. Didn’t key cases in 19th century mathematics
show that deriving mathematical results from visual intuition risks
wholescale error?2 While mathematics as an a priori science does
seem to possess a particular perspicuousness, couldn’t that rather
be because it involves reasoning using unusually explicit chains of
inference, and particularly compelling premises? Might not the
apparent directness of our mathematical insight cover up an uncon-
scious process of inference whereby we rule out other possibilities?
In any case, would not perception of necessity involve seeing neces-
sary connections between distinct existences, something shown
impossible by Hume? And surely, even if there were such necessary
connections to be known, perception is too simple (or, frankly, too
stupid) a faculty to perceive them? Moreover, even if it is correct to
say that we ‘intuit’ necessity, is this not necessity in some abstract
Platonic realm, rather than this concrete world? Finally, is not any
‘must-detecting’ faculty (Blackburn, 1986) incompatible with
naturalism?
One might ask whether mathematical necessity is only perceivable
for relatively simple arithmetic truths concerning discrete, countable
numbers of things easily gathered and inspected, as above. The answer
is not strictly relevant to our thesis, which is merely that at least some
diagrams allow the perception of necessity. However, a brief survey
will provisionally indicate other areas of mathematics where necessity
may be directly perceived.
Geometry traffics in irrational and continuously varying quantities,
so one might worry that at least some of its necessary truths concern
distinctions too fine for the naked eye to discern (for example that the
ratio of a circle’s circumference and diameter is π). However necessity
may also be perceived in geometry. Giaquinto gives this simple exam-
ple, similar to that in Plato’s Meno (Figure 2). The inside square, in
diamond orientation, has sides that connect the midpoints of the sides
of the larger square. How much is the area of the outside, compared
to the inside square? If we imagine folding in the four outer triangles,
we see that they would cover the inner square exactly – therefore the
larger square is twice its area (Giaquinto, 2007, fig. 4.13).© 2015 The Authors
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Figure 2 Why the Inside Square is Half the Outside Square.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY322Giaquinto (2007, pp. 28–29) argues – and we agree – that perception of this
geometrical necessity does not depend on any infinitely precise perception of
line-straightness or point-positioning. To use instruments to precisely mea-
sure sides and areas in order to ‘verify’ it would be beside the point.4 The vi-
sual sense is able to ‘rectify’ an approximate diagram and thereby see what
must be so in the relations of two exact squares positioned as shown. Once
again, some element of ‘seeing the reason why it must be so’ seems to guide
this rectification process.
What about very abstract areas of mathematics such as higher analysis
and transfinite mathematics? Surely here one must visualise infinitely large
sets, which is impossible? However, certain examples suggest that it is even
possible to perceive necessary truths that ‘go to infinity’. Consider the
diagram in Figure 3, which illustrates that the set of rational numbers has
the same cardinality as the (countable) natural numbers.
This result was enormously counterintuitive, since the rational numbers are
so thickly distributed on the real line. Cantor, who first proved it, famously
wrote in a letter to Dedekind, of a closely related result, ‘I see it but I don’t
believe it!’5 Though by no means proving our thesis, it is worth noting how
naturally Cantor reaches for visual language to express such crucial moments.
Specifically, by means of the clever organization of the fractions in
Figure 3 one can see that a progression through them has been defined so
systematically that every rational number has a unique well-defined place
in the sequence. This means that every whole number may be assigned one
corresponding rational number, and vice versa. One is not viewing the entire© 2015 The Authors
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Figure 3 Why the Set of Rational Numbers is Countable.6 [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
PERCEIVING NECESSITY 323infinite sequence of natural-rational pairings, but one doesn’t need to. One
can already see that the correspondence has to be one-one, by seeing ‘how
it works’ in some very general sense.7
Our project connects with a recent upsurge of interest in the role of
diagrams in necessary reasoning: both in mathematics (Brown, 2008;
Franklin, 2000; Giaquinto, 2007; Sherry, 2009a; Mumma, 2010; Catton
and Montelle, 2012: many of these authors inspired by Manders, 2008)
and in logic (Shin, 2002; Macbeth, 2005, 2009; Legg, 2012). This has been
prompted by growing awareness that diagrams frequently serve as more
than just post hoc illustration of necessary reasoning which has already taken
place in some more ‘serious’ nondiagrammatic form. This movement has
brought fresh perspectives to philosophy of mathematics and philosophical
logic. However, we believe that, even more importantly, it holds profound
implications for general epistemology which are currently blocked by fealty
to a certain picture of perception descending largely fromHume.We aim to
challenge that picture and open up that wider epistemological debate. We
have chosen to focus on mathematical necessity first, as we believe it pro-
vides the clearest illustration of our thesis, but hope to extend the thesis to
other forms of necessity, such as logical and physical, in future work.
The opposition which the Humean legacy offers to acceptance of our the-
sis includes ontological and epistemological dimensions. Profound ontolog-
ical morals are often drawn from Hume’s claim, ‘there are no necessary© 2015 The Authors
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PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY324connections between distinct existences’. This has been taken to imply that
there are no such necessities ‘out there’, hence no possibility of perceiving
them (Section 2). The epistemological dimension includes a thesis that per-
ception is both passive – involving a ‘registering’ of the impact of actual in-
dividual physical objects on the sense organs (Section 3) – and atomistic such
that ideas are only considered to be distinct – or even distinguishable – if fully
separable in the imagination (Section 4). Together these claims are taken to
imply the impossibility of perceiving anything modal. The final sections of
this article provisionally indicate significant empirical inadequacy in this un-
derstanding of perception (Section 5), and show how the examples above es-
cape it (Section 6), by enabling the mind to abstract (necessary connections)
without separating (objects).
Before continuing, we will briefly clarify what we mean by ‘perception’ in
our claim that necessity can be perceived.We intend aminimal and uncontro-
versial reading of this term: the direct acquisition of beliefs about reality
through veridical operations of the senses without the assistance of deliberate
mental actions such as imagining or explicit reasoning. Having said this,
where exactly the boundaries lie between perception and other suchmental ac-
tions is notoriously difficult to define. It is common to understand perception
as opposed to cognition, with the two distinguished insofar as perception is
objectual (I perceive a yellow chair) and cognition is propositional (I know that
the chair is yellow). Or, to give another example, hearing a sound stream as
divided into syllable-objects is perception, but understanding speech is not,
as it requires higher cognition.We will see that much inHume’s philosophical
legacy encourages this kind of non-cognitivism about perception. Yet such an
approach fails to explain how mere perception of objects might give rise to
knowledge of propositions (i.e. perceptual judgments). We prefer a different
approach to distinguishing perception from other mental faculties, focus-
sing on its forcedness compared to both freely imagining objects and mus-
ing on propositions. (This is why we state above: ‘without the assistance
of deliberate mental actions’.) Of course our approach in turn opens up
some difficult issues about where the boundary lies between perception
and deliberative (or ‘higher’) cognition. Those issues, which are relevant
to our thesis, will be discussed further in Sections 5 and 6.
Finally, by ‘reality’ we mean the everyday reality in which we move and
live.2. ‘No necessary connections between distinct existences’: the
claim and what it means
In the next three sections we critique certain aspects of ‘Humeanism’ or the
‘Humean legacy’. The focus is not on detailed exegetical scholarship somuch© 2015 The Authors
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PERCEIVING NECESSITY 325as the impact of certain of Hume’s famous dicta on pictures of necessity and
of perception deeply embedded in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Hume famously asserts:
No connexions between distinct existences are ever discoverable among human understanding
(Treatise, Appendix; Hume, 1739–40/1978).
and again:There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in them-
selves (Treatise, 1, III, vi).
and more expansively:
Any thing may produce any thing. Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these
may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine… no objects are contrary
to each other, but existence and non-existence (Treatise, 1, III, xv).
This conclusion that no objects are contrary but existence and non-existence
is quite remarkable. How about the ‘objects’ black and white? Or more rel-
evantly to our present purpose, equal and not equal?
Themeaning of these claims clearly depends crucially onwhat is meant by
‘existences’, or ‘objects’. If one means non-overlapping physical substances,
such as tables in a room, that is one claim, for which no doubt good argu-
ments could be mounted. But it seems Hume does not mean that, since ‘cre-
ation’, ‘non-existence’ and so on are not physical substances. And inHume’s
most famous application of his principle, to causality, he does not mean
physical substances either. In the famous scene where one billiard ball strikes
another, all we strictly see, Hume argues, is that the first ball moves towards
the second, and then touches it briefly, and then the second ball moves away
from the first:
I turn my eye to two objects suppos’d to be plac’d in that relation [of cause and effect]… I im-
mediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause
precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me
to discover any third relation betwixt these objects (Treatise, 1, III, xiv).
HereHume speaks as if the ‘objects’ are just the billiard balls themselves, but
he is actually talking about their motions.
What, then, does count as ‘objects’ or ‘existences’ here? Properties and
events must be allowed, if motions are to count. But then, what about the
properties ‘black’ and ‘white’? The events of 2 and 3 hours passing? Or, to
return to mathematics, the ‘objects’∅ and {∅}? Even if we restrict ourselves© 2015 The Authors
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between:
(1) The ball’s being at position 0 at time 0
(2) The ball’s being at position 1 at time 1
(3) The ball’s having velocity 1 through the time interval (0,1)
Namely, 1 and 3 imply 2; 2 and 3 imply 1; 3 implies (1 if and only if 2).8 Such
examples suggest that an inquisitive eye be turned also on the meaning of
‘distinct’. Are the empty set and its singleton ‘distinct’? They are not identi-
cal, but the former is an element of the latter, so it would seem that the latter
cannot exist without it (if of course the two can be said to exist).
In an intricate and searching paper JessicaWilson has pointed out that de-
spite widespread approval of Hume’s dictum in contemporary metaphysics
it is very difficult to define an unambiguous version of it that is simulta-
neously not subject to obvious counterexample, reasonably in accord with
intuition, and non-trivial, and which of these failings it ends up exemplifying
depends a great deal on the interpretation given to ‘distinct’. She explores a
range of definitions, which she refers to as numerical distinctness,weakmodal
distinctness, spatiotemporal distinctness, mereological distinctness and strong
modal distinctness (Wilson, 2010, pp. 5–11). Considering many different per-
mutations of these definitions with different interpretations of ‘necessary’,
she concludes overall that weaker versions of the dictum are analytically true
and thus unsuitable for doing any metaphysical work, while stronger ver-
sions are highly questionable.
Problems of this kind have been surprisingly little noticed. A certain
Humean Modal Combinatorialism, as it might be called, has had enormous
downstream philosophical influence. We name the claim thus as it holds that
‘objects’ (inHume’s terms) are all compossible; in other words, objects possess
no properties which rule out that they may be combined with one another in
any way whatsoever. It is also found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,9 which
strongly influenced Carnap’s treatment of necessity as truth in all ‘state-
descriptions’: complete permutations of truth-values across a given language’s
atomic propositions (Carnap, 1956). From there, the development of full-
fledged possible worlds semantics inspired an arguably ‘un-Humean’ leap to
replacing state descriptions conceived of as linguistic entities with analogous
metaphysical entities (of various kinds) which were argued to ‘truth-make’
modal claims. Yet even in Lewis’most extreme form ofmodal realism (Lewis,
1986),Modal Combinatorialism played a powerful role in his influential (self-
identified ‘Humean’) analysis of laws of nature as mere patterns of regularity
across subsets of possible worlds, where possible worlds are defined wholly in
terms of infinite and unrestricted permutations of simple objects and proper-
ties: ‘just one little thing, and then another’ (Lewis, 1986, ix). At that point the
view significantly shaped analyses of physicalism and supervenience through© 2015 The Authors
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PERCEIVING NECESSITY 327the 1970s and 1980s. Armstrong (1989, especially pp. 116–8) also made use of
Modal Combinatorialism to construct an ontology of allegedly discrete
atomic states of affairs, while at the same time, ironically, Lewis used it to ar-
gue that Armstrong’s concept of a state of affairs – in apparently requiring
particulars and universals to accompany one another necessarily –was subject
to a distressingly arbitrary ontological restriction (Lewis, 1992).
With Hume’s scepticism regarding real (i.e. irreducible) necessary connec-
tions between distinct existences so deeply ingrained, it is not surprising that
the possiblity of perceivable necessities has not been on the table. But there
is a further obstacle. What Hume means by ‘distinct’ cannot be fully under-
stood apart from his theory of perception and associated epistemology, which
are also highly influential in contemporary philosophy. To this we now turn.3. Humean theory of perception: passive
Yablo (1993) sketches the kind of ‘broad-brush’ counterargument com-
monly given against the perceivability of necessity:
… perception itself brings word of sensory mechanisms seemingly hard at work monitoring ex-
ternal conditions. By contrast, “we do not understand our own must-detecting faculty.” Not
only are we aware of no bodily mechanism attuned to modal aspects, it is unclear how such a
mechanism could work even in principle (Yablo, 1993, pp. 3–4).10
The talk of ‘mechanism’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘attunement’ indicates a certain
view of perception, as a passive process something like a thermometer’s
response to temperature. The environment acts, the mechanism responds
automatically. That is not the only possible approach. Older Aristotelian
and Rationalist traditions took a more active view of perception (Ebert,
1983; Spruit, 2008; Hatfield, 2007); so doesmuchmodern perceptual psychol-
ogy, as we will see later. The view Yablo describes descends from Hume.11
It is well known how Hume’s account of perception begins with causal
contact between our senses and objects both ‘internal’ and ‘external’, which
generates impressions and ideas. Impressions may spring from ‘outside the
mind’ (impressions of sensation) or ‘inside the mind’ (impressions of reflex-
ion), but the latter solely combine previous impressions of sensation, which
are the building blocks of all thought. To emphasise the mechanical, passive
nature of reflexion, Hume likens it too to perception – remembering is essen-
tially a perception of ideas that are ‘weaker’ and ‘less vivid’. In fact Hume
notes (following Locke, Essay, 1689/1979, IV.i.2–3) that there is an impor-
tant sense in which all mental activity is perception: ‘To hate, to love, to
think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive’ (Treatise 1, II, vi).12
Hume’s epistemic passivity also emerges in his denial of abstract ideas. He
defines these as ideas which are general in that at least some of their© 2015 The Authors
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isosceles or scalene, a ‘general man’ has no particular height or age).
Allowing abstract ideas would render the mind active since it would need
to choose which determinables to abstract from and then perform an act
of abstraction. Hume sees their denial as a properly naturalistic position to
take against scholastic obscurantism, since a major plank of pre-modern
epistemology was the mind’s grasp of Aristotelian real essences such as
‘man in general’.
The widespread philosophical influence of this view of perception today is
nicely illustrated by a recent argument in the philosophy of mathematics
concerning whether sets can be perceived. Maddy proposes that, when I
open a refrigerator and look at three eggs, I not only perceive the curved
white surfaces, I perceive that the surfaces form three eggs and in so doing
I perceive a set of three eggs. Balaguer counter-argues as follows:… we cannot perceive these sets. I begin by asking whether we can perceive the structural dif-
ference between an aggregate and a set.… Since the set and the aggregate are made of the same
matter, both lead to the same retinal stimulation … But … then the perceptual data about the
set is identical to the perceptual data about the aggregate. Thus, we cannot perceive the differ-
ence between the aggregate and the set. But since it is pretty obvious that we can perceive the
aggregate, and since there is a difference between the aggregate and the set, it follows that we
cannot perceive the set (Balaguer, 1994, p. 104; Maddy’s original argument in Maddy, 1990,
pp. 60–61).
The move from ‘we receive only one retinal stimulation’ (from both the
aggregate and the set) to ‘we cannot perceive the difference between the ag-
gregate and the set’ assumes that perception is a function of single sensory
impressions transformed without residue into single ideas. That expresses
a passive view of perception since it rules out the possibility that a relatively
low-level visual process might register the egg aggregate and a higher level,
more active, process recognise the set. (The latter is arguably an empirical
description of the mind’s forming an abstract idea.) It is the fact that
Balaguer does not feel the need to justify this view of perception that indi-
cates the success of Humeanism on this score.4. Humean theory of perception: atomist
Hume’s theory of perception is also importantly atomistic in that any dis-
tinguishable ideas effectively constitute separate ‘objects’ (whatever that
yet-unexplicated term means in the broader context of his philosophy).
For instance, when we distinguish shape from colour in an object such as
a white cube, it is not that we use reason to distinguish its colour and shape
as abstract ideas (of whiteness and cube-hood).13 Rather, Hume claims that© 2015 The Authors
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quasi-perceptual forcing apart of ideas we cannot distinguish them, though
we might think we can a cause of much confusion and wasted time in
philosophy.14 We now have a criterion of distinctness to use in evaluating
Hume’s maxim. Let’s call it Hume’s Separate Imaginability Criterion of
Distinctness. It essentially consists in the denial that, when distinguishing
ideas and objects, one might abstract (an idea) without separating (it into
a distinct object).
Let us return to Hume’sModal Combinatorialism, which we now see that
Hume wishes to apply to all ideas, qua building-blocks of his epistemology.
It is important to distinguish two definitions of combinatorialism. The first,
‘top-down’ definition claims that any whole can be decomposed into some
collection of atomic parts of certain specified kinds.15 The second,
‘bottom-up’ definition holds that given some collection of atomic parts,
any combination of them is possible. We suggest that Hume is committed
to the second, stronger, kind of combinatorialism.
Fogelin points out that Hume himself raised an objection to this claim, his
failure to answer which has scandalized his readers (Fogelin, 1984). Hume
admits that we could obtain knowledge of a missing shade of blue from
knowledge of actually perceived adjoining shades, a feat that apparently re-
quires some necessary relations among shades of blue. Fogelin writes:… an atomist in perceptual theory would deny the existence of any structure below the lowest
level of the perceptual ontology and thus would hold that each simple impression is a pure
content standing in no systematic relationship to any other simple impressions except for being
qualitatively identical with it or simply qualitatively different from it…Hume’s discussion of the
missing shade of blue shows that he does not accept such a theory of perception … (Fogelin,
1984, p. 268).
If we are able to imagine the missing shade of blue given its darker and ligh-
ter neighbours, it seems that we are able to decompose seen blues into more
fundamental concepts such as hue and darkness, with their own transitive
logic.16 The existence of such a necessary structure would violate the univer-
sal mutual compossibility of distinct ideas insofar as it is impossible for A to
be darker than B, B darker than C and A not darker than C. But it also vi-
olates Hume’s stated dictum that ‘… nothing is contrary but existence and
non-existence’. We suggest, as have several commentators, that what Hume
says about themissing shade of blue is ambiguous and inconclusive, and that
Hume’s views at this point suffer overall inconsistency.17 LikeHume’s meta-
physical combinatorialism, his atomism about perception has settled deep in
analytic philosophy, where it may be most clearly seen in early attempts to
‘construct’ external reality from individualized sensations.18
We have now established a certain general picture of perception as a
passive registering of objects that are all atomistic (‘loose and separate’, in© 2015 The Authors
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epistemology according to which knowledge of necessity cannot enter the
mind through the senses, which in turn produces a metaphysics according
to which ‘nothing is contrary but existence and non-existence’. In the next
section we hold this general picture up to contemporary science and
suggest it is wanting, before returning to our examples of perceiving
necessities in mathematics.5. Cognitive psychology’s counterexamples to Humean theo-
ries of perception
There is no lack of contemporary research which undermines both the passiv-
ity and atomism of theHumean view of perception.With respect to the passiv-
ity, it has become clear that the brain’s perceptual functioning is far from
Hume’s simple copying of impressions into ideas. Rather, the brain is contin-
ually comparing its input against complex sets of prior (possibly learned)
expectations, using mismatches for purposes of self-correction. Gregory
(1980) advanced the idea that all perceptions should in fact be understood as
hypotheses which are then checked against further incoming data,19 and this
idea has lately been gaining ground (e.g. Hohwy, 2010; Clark, 2013).
With respect to the atomism, current consensus appears to be that most
key aspects of visual perception are attained not only – as a Humean would
expect – via ‘bottom-up’ accumulation of masses of low-level visual impres-
sions, but also by directly registering high-level structural properties. This
applies at least to colour, contour, size, and relative motion (Kaufman,
1974). Moreover, those researchers who understand perception as hypothe-
sis have shown that not only is the mind organised sufficiently holistically to
support ‘top-down predictions’, it operates this way at a number of distinct
functional levels which are richly inter-related, producing ‘… a cascade of
cortical processing events in which higher-level systems attempt to predict
the inputs to lower level ones on the basis of their own emerging models of
the causal structure of the world’ (Clark, 2013).20
A particularly nice anti-atomistic example is the perception of symmetry.
This is a high-level structural property. In fact the necessary truth perceivable
in Figure 1 draws directly on symmetry-perception in recognising the same-
ness of the rows and columns, while the symmetry of the square and of the di-
amond plays a key role in recognising the necessary truth shown in Figure 2.
As an example of the many scientific results regarding symmetry percep-
tion, we take the differences between perception of bilateral symmetry about
a vertical axis and other symmetries (such as symmetries about other axes, or
repetitions of shapes in friezes). Vertical bilateral symmetry is perceived
much more rapidly. It is said to be ‘preattentive’ in that it can be perceived© 2015 The Authors
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the time the brain takes to attend to anything. It is possible to perceive
vertical bilateral symmetry in simple random shapes presented for only 25
milliseconds (Wagemans, 2002). These precise measurements confirm exper-
imentally what is obvious perceptually in figures such as Figure 4: that ver-
tical bilateral symmetry has an immediate and salient ‘look’ compared to
symmetry about an oblique axis.
This effect is what underlies the fact that a square is perceived as a differ-
ent shape from a diamond, as in Figure 2 above. Though the two are congru-
ent, their symmetries are differently related to the environmental horizontal
and vertical axes.
These results show that symmetry perception combines what Hume alleges
to be impossible. Symmetry is a global property of an array: it is a relation be-
tween parts, not a property of any one part. So perception of it cannot be
atomic. Nor can it be passive, since epistemic activity is needed to compare
the parts in this particular way. Yet it is immediate – as immediate as any per-
ception can be, at least in the case of vertical bilateral symmetry – and unques-
tionably pre-reflective, as the perception occurs below the timescale on which
reflection operates. The deeply automatic and pre-reflective nature of symme-
try perception is confirmed by its appearance in animals, including very sim-
ple ones. Perception of symmetry has been demonstrated in apes, dolphins
and birds; it is possible to train bees to prefer either symmetrical orFigure 4 Vertical-axis Symmetry (b and d) Contrasted with other Axes
(a and c).21
© 2015 The Authors
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to them (Giurfa et al., 1996). Bees are animals innocent of reflection, and it is
hard to believe they deal in ‘relations of ideas’, in Hume’s sense. They just see.
Such examples not only refute Humean atomism about perception, but
supply an answer to one of the objections to the thesis that we perceive neces-
sity that was mentioned in Section 1. Might not the apparent immediacy of
our perception that 2×3=3×2 be a cover for some processes of unconscious
inference? It is true that the phenomenology is against it, since our insight
seems immediate, but then introspective phenomenology is widely suspected
of making many errors. Might not the feeling of immediacy be an illusion?
We now see that the existence of unconscious inferences is no objection to
a process’s being perceptual, since perception typically involves unconscious
inferences. (Recall that the definition of perception given in Section 1 only
ruled out ‘deliberatemental actions such as imagining or explicit reasoning’.)
The empirical results discussed above suggest that if perception could not in-
volve unconscious inference, then we would be unable to perceive symmetry
(on the basis of sameness of parts).
It might be protested that this understanding of perception still raises the
question of which inferences are performed in perception and which are left
to ‘higher’ levels of cognition (and here by ‘higher’, following our definition
of perception in §1, we mean more deliberate, or more accessible to deliber-
ation). It might be worried that without such an account we cannot dismiss
the possibility that the necessities apparently perceived in section §1 are in
principle beyond the inferential capacities of perception.
There is currently no agreed answer to this question. However, valuable
light has been recently cast on it by an extensive philosophical discussion
of Fodor’s ‘modularity of mind’ thesis (Robbins, 2009). Fodor pointed to
well-known perceptual phenomena such as the Müller-Lyer illusion
(Figure 5), where two lines persist in appearing to be of different lengths even
when the subject knows they are the same.Figure 5 The Müller-Lyer Illusion.
© 2015 The Authors
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that the lines ‘look different’ in length is to say that the comparison takes
place within perception. But the inference is ‘informationally encapsulated’,
the visual ‘module’ being not ‘cognitively penetrable’ by the beliefs –
acquired for example by measurement – of the higher cognitive faculties.
Later work (e.g. Vetter and Newen, 2014) has tended to show that percep-
tion is to some small degree penetrable by deliberative cognition. Theory can
sometimes override lower-level perceptions, whence the difficulty of spotting
typos. But that is not significant for the present argument.What is important
(andwe hope to showobvious) is that the visual and other perceptual
modules have inherent capacities to perceive complex relational properties,
below the level of the higher cognitive faculties, and to deliver the results
whole ‘upstairs’.6. How our examples escape the Humean theses
Let us return to our examples of Section 1 – prima facie clear cases of per-
ceiving necessity – and reexamine them in the light of what we have learned
about Hume’s maxim, his theory of perception, and the true capacities of
perception. We begin with Figure 1:
This diagram demonstrates a necessary truth. Does it demonstrate a
necessary connection between distinct existences? Well, what exactly are
the ‘existences’ here, which the Humean would wish to deny are necessarily
connected? For a very natural objection22 to our view asks what objects
could possibly be perceived in the case of perception of necessity such as is
claimed to exist in this case. If I see that the ground is wet, I see the ground
and its watery surface. In perceiving that 2×3=3×2, what objects do I per-
ceive? How can my knowledge of this necessary truth be perceptual unless I
can perceive mathematical objects?© 2015 The Authors
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will then sketch a fourth, non-Humean view, which we favour.
(i) Physical Mark View: Here we might understand the relevant ‘ob-
jects’ or existences to be 6 stars and 5 ovals (and further combina-
tions of these, for example the 5 oval+ star combinations), exactly
as scribed on the page. This appears to be a natural choice in
terms of the organisation of our visual field. Recall the Humean
Separate Imaginability Criterion of Distinctness: we can imagine
each shape existing on its own on the page. But then it is false that
there are no necessary connections between these objects as posi-
tioned in Figure 1. For instance, one cannot remove stars from the
vertical ovals without thereby removing them from the horizontal
ovals. Interpreted thus, then, Hume’s maxim is simply incorrect.
(ii) Abstract Object View: On the other hand, we might take the neces-
sary connection just noted as a sign that our diagram does not dis-
play a truth about physical marks but about some reality that is
more purely mathematical or ‘abstract’. Under this interpretation,
the relevant objects/existences might be identified as (three) ‘2s’
and (two) ‘3s’. These abstract objects are arguably not distinct from
one another. For instance we might plausibly understand 2 as made
up of ‘two ones’ and 3 as made up of ‘three ones’, and thus see 2 as a
proper part of 3. At this point, then, Hume might defend his maxim
by stating that Figure 1 solely expresses relations between ideas,
which he never meant to claim were distinct existences (his famously
sharp distinction between matters of fact and relations between
ideas is precisely meant to teach this), so it is not a counterexample
to his maxim.
But there is something unsatisfying here. It seems puzzling to claim that
we can gain mathematical knowledge, as we clearly can, by examining
Figure 1, and yet that mathematical objects are entirely separate from
our experience. How is it then that the diagram is so effective? Further-
more, now Hume’s maxim seems to beg the question. He seems to be ar-
bitrarily ruling out that we perceive the kinds of existences between which
necessary connections clearly hold, by labelling them as ‘mere ideas’. He
seems happy to apply a Separate Imaginability Criterion of Distinctness
in the causal case (the billiard balls), where it rules that the motions of
the two balls are distinct since one can be imagined apart from the other,
and thereby justifies Hume’s favoured intuitions about causality. But in
Figure 1 one may equally imagine each oval+ star object existing on its
own. Yet as noted, these objects as assembled in Figure 1 do seem to have
necessary connections between them. If Hume then argues that the stars
and ovals cannot be distinct existences precisely because of these© 2015 The Authors
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2015 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
PERCEIVING NECESSITY 335necessary connections, his maxim effectively becomes: ‘there are no neces-
sary connections between distinct existences, which are those existences
between which there are no necessary connexions’. It is then devoid of
philosophical content.
(iii) ‘Both’ View: Given these problems with both the Physical Mark
view and the Abstract Object view, a Humean might attempt to
compromise by combining the two, stating that the best account
of the objects represented by Figure 1 is that there are ovals and
stars and 2s and 3s. However such a compendium raises tricky ques-
tions of the relationship between the physicalmarks and the abstract
objects. It would seem to treat the physical marks and the abstract
objects as existences distinct from each other, in which case, accord-
ing to Hume, they must be separable. In that case, why include the
stars and ovals in the diagram at all? Why not lose the physical
marks, keep the twos and threes and draw the mathematical moral
straight from them? This is obviously impossible in Figure 1, thus
the view itself risks incoherence.
(iv) Partial Identity View: This final remark points the way to a fourth
interpretation which we believe is closest to the truth. This view is
‘hybrid (between the Physical Mark and the Abstract Object
views) … but not both’. Rather than understanding physical
marks and abstract objects as separate existences, it is more
accurate to understand abstraction as a mental process whereby
we perceive in the diagram as it exists on the page certain partial
identities. What does this mean? Just that ‘twoness’ may be
abstracted from this:
while precisely not being separable from it as a distinct object. This© 2015 Th
Pacific Phikind of ‘distinction of reason’ is of course exactly what Hume’s epis-
temology rules out as impossible. Yet abstractionwithout separation
is essential for all structural reasoning, since a structure cannot exist
without objects to structure. And structural reasoning is surely a sig-
nificant part of mathematics. One might even argue that all neces-
sary reasoning is structural (Legg, 2012).This is our answer to the objection that asks what objects could possibly be
perceived in the case of perception of necessity such as is claimed to exist in
the 2×3=3×2 case. We do not perceive, or need to perceive, abstract num-
bers or operators. We do need to perceive mathematical properties ofe Authors
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but that is possible by ordinary perception. We can perceive that the ground
is wet, and we can perceive just as directly that that ground is divisible, or
parted. In the array of crosses, we can perceive that a part is a cross, that
it is a cross congruent to a cross elsewhere in the array, that the array has
parts in various ways: as rows and columns of crosses. As there are necessary
relations between those different divisions into parts, there is no obstacle in
principle to perceiving those relations or their necessity.
Of course, perception of the structural partial identities described above is
necessary but not sufficient for perceiving the necessity of 2×3=3×2. But
there is only one further thing that needs to be recognised in this case. This
is the full-fledged identity between the two (abstractable but not separable)
structures realised by the diagram: namely 2×3 (two rows of three stars)
and 3×2 (three columns of two stars). In other words, once the two-row/
three-column structure is perceived in Figure 1, all that is needed to perceive
2×3=3×2 is the recognition that these are two decompositions of the same
whole. There is no difficulty in perceiving that. The six stars and their two de-
compositions are plain for the eye to see.23 Thus we see that the two sides of
the equation are equal, and that variants such as 2×3=3×3 are impossible.
Can a similar analysis be extended to our geometrical Figure 2?
Here the result that the diamond is half the area of the square comes
from recognizing that the area of each quarter of the diamond equals the
area of the triangle outside it. All that is required for this is perception of
the symmetry of the figure. What are this diagram’s relevant objects?
Again, we might attempt to define a Physical Mark view that the relevant© 2015 The Authors
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However here in the non-discrete field of geometry we can see even more
clearly that this interpretation is not correct. It was noted earlier that dia-
grams as instantiated frequently contain imperfections which perception
‘rectifies’. Thus, the necessary truth perceived here (that the diamond is
half the area of the square) might not even be true of Figure 2, if its shapes
were carefully measured.24
On the other hand an Abstract Object view would say that the real
objects of the diagram are some kind of general square, diamond and
triangle. And yet despite that, somehow, viewing the physical marks
helps us to perceive the necessary truth. Why is this? Once again, our
favoured account rests on the perceiving mind’s ability to abstract from
the diagram (but also at the same time appropriately reunite mentally)
overall structural features which are sufficiently general to rectify minor
diagrammatic inaccuracies where necessary.
Figure 3 concerns transfinite arithmetic. Hume is famously dismis-
sive of infinity: because our ideas of quantity cannot be divided indef-
initely, he argues, neither can quantity itself.25 For similar reasons,
Humeans such as Wittgenstein take a sceptical view towards ‘rule-
following’ across infinite sequences. And yet this proof in transfinite
arithmetic works, and its work is heavily dependent on perception.
Our diagram shows in some general sense how one-one matching
between natural and rational numbers can proceed across an infinite
series. Although we do not perceive the whole series, we see enough
recursive structure to be sure the proof is correct. Hume claimed,
following Berkeley, that any supposed abstract idea is nothing but a
particular, entirely determinate idea that annexes itself to a general
term, and associates with other particular ideas which it resembles in
relevant ways. But that story clearly does not fit this case, since it
would require either a particular, determinate idea which is infinitely
complex, or an infinite number of them.7. Perceiving necessity versus platonist intuition
A different objection to our thesis that necessity may be perceived derives
from philosophical Platonism, which has modern adherents in philosophers
such as James Robert Brown and Elijah Chudnoff. According to this view,
there is a sharp distinction between sensory perception and so-called ‘intel-
lectual perception’. Mathematical insight falls into the latter category, so
although we may have ‘intuition’ of the realm of Forms (or – as more com-
monly known these days – abstract objects), there is not, and cannot be, any
perception of necessity in the physical world. Such views are obviously© 2015 The Authors
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Humeans think, there are no necessities, and a Platonic realm of the ab-
stract, where all necessities reside. As Chudnoff explains:
Abstract reality encompasses the necessary, normative, infinite and abstract as in
non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. Mathematics, metaphysics and morality are about it.
Concrete reality encompasses the contingent, non-normative, finite and concrete as in spatio-
and/or temporal and/or causally efficacious. Physics, psychology and history are about it
(Chudnoff, 2013, p. 11; similar in Brown, 2008, pp. 13–14).
Such an argument rests on a rigid dichotomy between the concrete
and the abstract whereby all necessity lives in the acausal abstract
realm, while the causal physical realm is all contingency. Somewhat
ironically, given the otherwise divergent nature of their philosophies,
both Hume and Plato subscribe to this dichotomy. They merely differ
in that whereas Hume’s treatment of relations between ideas is scepti-
cal, seeking to reduce such truths to (relatively trivial) stipulated
verbal definitions, Plato makes such relations the basis for a transcen-
dent metaphysical realm.
A key purpose of this article is to call this dichotomy into question. The
last section showed that to regard a mathematical diagram such as
Figure 1 as somehow representing both concrete and abstract objects
as separate existences conflicts with our phenomenology of gaining
mathematical knowledge from such diagrams. When examined, the di-
agram’s system of physical marks seems not to be possessed of solely
contingent properties – since as noted one cannot alter the arrange-
ment of stars in the vertical ovals without altering that in the horizon-
tal ovals – and the relevant abstract objects (2s and 3s) are not clearly
separable from them. We therefore urge that the only way to account
for the phenomenology of understanding the proof in Figure 1 is to
understand its relevant mathematical concepts to be abstractable from
the physical mark. This is not an ontological reification but an episte-
mic process. One might go so far as to say that the whole concept of
an ‘abstract object’, which has such wide currency in contemporary
philosophy of mathematics, constitutes a mistake predicated on not
understanding that one can abstract without separating.26 Thus, in
Euler’s famous proof that one could not walk over all the bridges of
Königsberg once without walking over at least one of them twice:
the impossibility applies (strictly and literally) to real paths over real
bridges, not merely to some abstract model of them (Franklin, 2014,
ch. 5). In that way, our account might be understood as counterposing
an Aristotelian realist account of mathematical objects to the Plato-
nism which features so prominently in contemporary philosophy of
mathematics as realism’s representative.27© 2015 The Authors
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We can perceive necessary truths. In such perception the mind is not passive
and atomistic, but active and integrated – simultaneously abstracting, and
recognising identities amongst, structural features of what is perceived, in
ways that confer real insight. If we were to work out the consequences of this
insight for epistemology, where would it take us? We suggest that at this
point it could be extremely helpful to look back to rationalist and scholastic
views largely left behind by Anglo-American philosophy, which has so ad-
mired Hume and Plato. These older views taught that certain knowledge
may be attained from ideas that are sufficiently clear and distinct. Our
examples arguably show clear and distinct perceptions giving rise to direct
knowledge of mathematical necessities. The onus is on contemporary episte-
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NOTES
1 A claim reminiscent of Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in particular Bk II, ch. 2.
2 An example is the claim that a function which is continuous is differentiable almost every-
where: visual intuition suggested this was true, but it is false. This example is nicely discussed in
Giaquinto, 2007, pp. 3–4; and Mumma, 2010, pp. 3–4.
3 By permission of Oxford University Press.
4 That would be to agree with the naïve view that technical drawing is the same subject as ge-
ometry, but more accurate. David Sherry notes, ‘… more sophisticated empirical observations,
such as measurement, play no role in diagrammatic reasoning even if they can be useful for
suggesting theorems’ (Sherry, 2009a, p. 62). He points out that under the right circumstances a
diagram may even be used to prove of a mathematical object properties which are clearly false
of the diagram.
5 Cantor to Dedekind, 29 June 1877. The result referred to is the sameness of cardinality of
the unit interval and the unit square, of which Cantor gives a partly visual proof (Gouvêa, 2011).
The rigor of ‘seeing’ in a similar proof is defended in Azzouni, 2013.
6 Image created by Maria Miller, reproduced with permission from http://www.
homeschoolmath.net/teaching/rational-numbers-countable.php
7 Further on seeing truths in diagrams that represent continuation to infinity in (Feferman,
1998, 2012).
8 Advanced players will notice that the three distinct implications just listed also have nec-
essary connections between them. Many more complex mathematical necessities about billiard
ball trajectories are listed at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Billiards.html .
9 §1.12: ‘Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same’
(Wittgenstein, 1961).© 2015 The Authors
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10 The internal quote is from Blackburn, 1986, p. 52; Yablo is actually considering the rela-
tion between conceivability and possibility, but the issue of naturalism and modality is the same
as in our case.
11 There is some ancestry in earlier empiricism: ‘… the reception of the Ideas of light, round-
ness, and heat, wherein I am not active but barely passive, and cannot in that position of my
Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them.’ (Locke, Essay 2.21.72).
12 See also Enquiry, p. 152 (Hume, 1748/1975).
13 This process was sometimes referred to in the medieval period as ‘prescinding’,
‘prescission’ or ‘abstraction’ of qualities from a given object. (Weinberg, 1965, part 1)
14 ‘… if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distin-
guishable; if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor distinguishable. What
then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation?’
(Treatise, 1, I, vii).
15 This seems to be what is meant by ‘combinatorialism’ in philosophy of language and re-
lated disciplines.
16 We noted that Hume largely follows Locke in his passive theory of perception and in
seeking to construct ‘an entirely perception-driven epistemology’. Locke also tackles the issue
of ‘colour logic’, and from whence, in such a framework, it might be derived. He writes: ‘For
when we know that white isn’t black, what do we perceive other than that these two ideas don’t
agree?’ (Essay, IV.i.2) But here the phrase ‘don’t agree’ hides a crucial elision – from ‘black and
white are different’ to ‘black and white are contrary’ – an elision to which Locke’s raw empiricism
is arguably not entitled. The authors are grateful to Max Cresswell for pressing us to work
out this point.
17 Fogelin finishes his remark above by noting ‘… it is not easy to find a clear statement of
[Hume’s] positive views on these matters.’
18 Russell’s logical atomism in at least one of its phases aimed to analyse the basic
concepts of physics in terms of perceptual simples such as patches of colour and
auditory notes (Russell, 1914; Klement, 2009, sect. 3), and Carnap’s Aufbau continued
the project.
19 See also (Gregory, 1970, 1998). Gregory attributes the original idea to Helmholtz. Influ-
ential intermediary work was done by MacKay (1956) and Neisser (1967).
20 Accepting the inferential nature of perception does not lead to any relativist
thesis of the ‘theory-ladenness of perception’, for reasons explained in Fodor, 1990,
pp. 238–249.
21 Figure fromWenderoth, 1996, reprinted with permission from Elsevier; the effect is dem-
onstrated in 4-month-olds (Bornstein and Krinsky, 1985).
22 Raised by an anonymous referee. See also the field-defining critique of Benacerraf, 1973.
23 In seminar presentations of this material, attempts have been made to argue that
insofar as the partial identities must be abstracted and therefore perceived separately
(constitute examples of ‘seeing as’, in Wittgensteinian terms), this means that the full-fledged
identity cannot be accessed solely via perception but must rely on memory or deliberate
inference to at least some degree. It cannot be seen at a glance. We reject this criticism
on phenomenological grounds.
24 Again, (Sherry, 2009a) is useful here, noting that in fact geometrical diagrams function via
stipulation as much as by observation. In Fig. 3 the equality of the four triangles, the perfect
straightness of the lines, and other matters are taken to be implicitly stipulated.
25 Hume, Treatise, 1, II, v, p. 52; Hume has been roundly criticised for this, e.g. Flew, 1976;
Fogelin, 1985; Franklin, 1994; Jacquette, 2002. For a more sympathetic reading, see De Pierris,
2012. See also Sherry, 2009b, for an original blurring of Hume’s distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact in a discussion of applied mathematics.
26 The many problems of the standard conception are explained in Rosen, 2012.
27 For a extensively worked-out recent account of such Aristotelianism in mathematics, see
Franklin, 2014.© 2015 The Authors
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